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1 **Lack of evidence for presymptomatic transmission of pandemic influenza virus A(H1N1)**  
2 **2009 in an outbreak among teenagers; Germany, 2009**

3  
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7 Running head: outbreak of A(H1N1) 2009 at a teenagers' party

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28

29 **Abstract**

30

31 **Background:** Observations on the role of pre-symptomatic transmission in the spread of  
32 influenza virus are scanty. In June 2009, an outbreak of pandemic A(H1N1) 2009 infection  
33 occurred at a teenager's party in Germany.

34 We performed a retrospective cohort study among party guests to identify risk factors for  
35 pandemic A(H1N1) 2009 infection.

36 **Methods:** Symptomatic pandemic A(H1N1) 2009 infection diagnosed by polymerase chain  
37 reaction between 1-14 June 2009 was defined as the outcome. Contact patterns among party  
38 guests were evaluated.

39 **Results:** In eight (36%) of 27 party guests the outcome was ascertained. A travel-returnee from  
40 a country with endemic pandemic A(H1N1) 2009 who fell ill towards the end of the party was  
41 identified as the source case. Party guests with pandemic A(H1N1) 2009 infection had talked  
42 significantly longer to the source case than non-infected persons (p-value: 0.001). Importantly,  
43 none (0/9) of those who had left the party prior to the source case's symptom onset became  
44 infected compared to 7 (41%) of 17 who stayed overnight (p= 0.06), and these persons all had  
45 transmission-prone contacts to the source case.

46 **Conclusions:** In this outbreak with one index case there was no evidence to support pre-  
47 symptomatic transmission of pandemic A(H1N1) 2009. Further evidence is required, ideally  
48 from larger studies with multiple index cases, to more accurately characterize the potential for  
49 presymptomatic transmission of influenza virus.

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51 **Key words:** influenza A virus, H1N1 subtype; outbreak; cohort study; epidemiology;  
52 transmission; presymptomatic infectiousness

53 **Introduction**

54 After its first identification in Mexico in April 2009 the pandemic influenza virus A (H1N1) 2009  
55 rapidly spread over all continents. On 11 June 2009, WHO raised the pandemic alert from level  
56 5 to 6, marking the official beginning of the 2009 influenza pandemic.

57 Symptom-based interventions, such as isolation of cases, contact tracing and quarantine, were  
58 important public health measures to contain infection and delay spread at the early stages of  
59 the 2009 pandemic [1-3]. Their success may be limited if a substantial proportion of  
60 transmissions occurs through apparently healthy individuals (presymptomatic or asymptomatic)  
61 [4]. To our knowledge, there are no experimental or controlled studies, and only one  
62 observational study on presymptomatic transmission [5]. Therefore, viral presence in the upper  
63 respiratory tract is used as a proxy to infer infectiousness, also of symptom-free individuals [6-  
64 9]. However, even in these studies, data on viral shedding in the presymptomatic phase are  
65 scanty, and the relationship between nasopharyngeal virus detection and transmission is  
66 uncertain [7].

67

68 We report on the investigation of a pandemic A(H1N1) 2009 outbreak in a confined setting of a  
69 teenager's party in Germany in June 2009, where most of the exposure time was during the  
70 source case's presymptomatic period.

71

72 **Methods**

73 Outbreak setting

74 A group of 28 teenagers celebrated a party for two female teenage friends on 31 May 2009. The  
75 two friends had returned from Argentina - a country with community transmission of pandemic  
76 A(H1N1) 2009 at that time - two days earlier by air travel. By that time, less than 100 human  
77 cases, mostly travel-related, with confirmed pandemic A(H1N1) 2009 infection had been notified  
78 in Germany.

79 The party was held in a private house and lasted from 6 p.m. until the following morning.

80 Eighteen party guests, including the two returnees, stayed overnight, the remaining nine left the

81 party between 11.30 p.m. and 1 June 2 a.m. One of the returnees (R1), female / 16 years of  
82 age, became symptomatic with influenza-like illness (ILI), defined as fever and cough or sore  
83 throat, on 1 June after 2 a.m. and stayed until 11.30 a.m. She was the first party guest with  
84 pandemic A(H1N1) 2009 infection confirmed by real-time reverse transcription-polymerase  
85 chain reaction (rRT-PCR) on 4 June. The other returnee (R2) had experienced symptoms of  
86 mild respiratory disease (coryza) since 26 May and was still mildly symptomatic during the  
87 party. She developed ILI on 2 June. After the diagnosis of pandemic A(H1N1) 2009 infection of  
88 R1 was reported to the local health authority on 4 June, the health officers contacted all party  
89 guests and asked about respiratory symptoms, fever or myalgia during the time since the party.  
90 Symptomatic individuals were tested between 4-7 June by nasal and throat swabs for pandemic  
91 A(H1N1) 2009 using rRT-PCR [10] performed at the Bavarian Health and Food Safety  
92 Authority, Oberschleissheim.

93

#### 94 Cohort study

95 We conducted a retrospective cohort study among all party guests to identify the source case  
96 and characterize transmission risks. We defined a case as pandemic A(H1N1) 2009 infection  
97 confirmed by rRT-PCR who developed ILI between 1 and 5 June.  
98 Between 13 and 22 June we administered a questionnaire to the party guests. The  
99 questionnaire covered demographical characteristics, symptoms at or after the party (e.g.,  
100 fever, cough, sore throat, myalgia), potential exposures to pandemic A(H1N1) 2009 cases  
101 outside the party cohort, party attendance (time of arrival and departure) and information on  
102 duration and frequency of contacts during the party, which was assessed by the following  
103 variables: duration of talking (0 minutes, 1-14 minutes, 15-60 minutes, >1-4 h, >4 h) at  $\leq 1$  meter  
104 distance to each of the other party guests; frequency of hugging or kissing each of the other  
105 party guests (0x, 1-2x, 3-5x, >5x), and other contact types, e.g., staying overnight, sharing  
106 drinks, dancing with somebody. We obtained written informed consent of the participants'  
107 parents. Data were entered into an Epidata database (version 3.1) and analyzed using Stata®  
108 (v10.1 StataCorp, USA). We considered two-sided p-values  $<0.05$  statistically significant.

109

110 *Source identification:* We hypothesized that one or both of the returnees were the source  
111 case(s) for the other party guests since they returned to Germany from a country, which had  
112 already reported community transmission of pandemic A(H1N1) 2009 at the time. We compared  
113 talking to and hugging or kissing R1 and R2 between infected and non-infected party guests  
114 using the Wilcoxon rank-sum test. We assumed that pandemic A(H1N1) 2009 infected persons  
115 had talked longer to the source case(s) and hugged or kissed her or them more often than  
116 uninfected persons. We also compared clinical manifestation, dates of symptom onset and  
117 dates of sampling between R1 and R2.

118 *Risk factor analysis for pandemic A(H1N1) 2009 infection:* Due to the small sample size and the  
119 presence of “zero cells”, we employed bivariable exact logistic regression to compute odds  
120 ratios, 95% confidence intervals (CI) and two-sided p-values for all contact variables. To this  
121 end, we dichotomized the categorical contact variables (i.e. talking to the source case, hugging  
122 or kissing the source case) using their respective median as cut-off.

123

## 124 **Results**

125 Overall, 27 (96%) out of 28 guests participated in the study. Their average age was 16 years  
126 (range 15-19 years), 15 (55%) were girls.

127 Of 27 individuals, 25 could be contacted initially by the local health authority. Of these, ten (8  
128 with ILI, 2 with symptoms not fitting the ILI case definition) were tested by rRT-PCR. All 8  
129 individuals with ILI were positive. According to the questionnaires, four additional persons, of  
130 whom one had ILI, reported respiratory symptoms with onset during the outbreak period. In  
131 total, 9 ILI cases were ascertained, of whom 8 were tested and positive. Of 5 individuals with  
132 symptoms not fitting the ILI definition, two were tested and had a negative result.

133 Of 15 female individuals, 7 (47%) became cases compared to only one (8%) of 12 males  
134 ( $p=0.06$ ).

135

136 Source identification

137 Cases (excluding the returnees) reported a significantly longer duration of talking to R1 and a  
138 higher number of hugs and kisses exchanged with her than non-cases (table 1). In addition,  
139 symptoms and timing of disease onset and sampling of R1 are fully compatible with influenza.  
140 By contrast, we found no significant differences with respect to the contact variables for R2  
141 between cases and non-cases. She likely had two respiratory illnesses, of which the first,  
142 starting already on the 26 May, was not influenza-like. Furthermore, the positive sample was  
143 taken 9 days after onset of the first respiratory illness, which does not support an influenza  
144 infection at that time. In contrast, the second respiratory illness, occurring one day after disease  
145 onset of R1, was an ILI and it is highly likely to find influenza virus in an influenza-infected  
146 person 2 days after disease onset. Taken together, we concluded that R1 was the source case  
147 who infected also R2.

148

#### 149 Incubation period

150 The date of contact with the symptomatic index case was 1 June. Dates of symptom onset for  
151 the other cases ranged from 2 June through 5 June, corresponding to an incubation period of 1-  
152 4 days with a mean of 1.5 days.

153

#### 154 Risk factor analysis for pandemic A(H1N1) 2009 infection

155 Having identified R1 as the source case, we included R2 in the following analyses (n=26). All  
156 variables relating to R1 had increased odds for infection (table 2). Strength of association for  
157 becoming a case was highest for talking to R1  $\geq$  15 minutes (OR 16.9, 95% CI 2.12 - +Inf), and  
158 kissing or hugging her more than twice (OR 11.6, 95% CI: 1.24 - 179.08). All party guests  
159 reported talking to the source case, but none of those who had talked to R1 <15 minutes  
160 became a case. None (0/9, 95% CI: 0-33%) of the party guests became a case who did not stay  
161 overnight and thus left before R1 developed symptoms, compared to 7 (41%) of 17 who stayed  
162 overnight (p= 0.06). Two out of the 9 who did not stay overnight developed an acute respiratory  
163 illness that did not meet the ILI definition, one of them was tested negative for pandemic  
164 A(H1N1) 2009 by rRT-PCR.

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## **Discussion**

In this investigation of a pandemic influenza outbreak among teenage party guests, we were able to identify a travel returnee from Argentina as the likely source for all other cases. The source case's symptom onset occurred after 2 a.m. which allowed us to categorize the exposure time during the party into a presymptomatic and a symptomatic period. Presumably, not all influenza cases are equally infectious [11]. However, this particular case apparently was highly capable of transmitting the virus (secondary attack rate 26.9%). Most notably, transmission was not observed among the nine party guests who were exposed only during the presymptomatic period. These persons all had transmission-prone contacts, which included talking to the source case for at least 1-14 minutes at a distance of less than 1 meter, as well as hugging, kissing, and likely, but unmeasured, passing her or dancing next to her several times.

Considering R1 as the only source case is plausible. She had just returned from a pandemic A(H1N1) 2009 endemic country and only contact variables relating to her were significantly associated with becoming a case - not for any other guest, including the other travel returnee. Furthermore, her symptom onset, the earliest of all pandemic A(H1N1) 2009 infected persons, was during the party, and the time interval between her symptom onset and that of secondary cases is in line with the incubation period derived from other outbreak investigations [12;13]. All secondary cases had contact to R1 during her symptomatic phase. Compared to non-cases, they had talked longer to the source case during the entire party and had had, anecdotally, also more intense contact to the source case (close friends). This likely applies also for the presymptomatic period and thus it remains unclear, at which point the cases became infected. More in-depth analysis (e.g. restricting analysis to those who had exposure during the symptomatic phase), would have necessitated collection of exposure information separately for the two periods (presymptomatic / symptomatic), which was not done. This is one limitation of our study. Furthermore, the accuracy of the exposure recall 2-3 weeks after the event may be different depending on the infection status. However the party was a rather unique and



193 memorable event for the participants in the light of heightened media attention of this first  
194 community outbreak of pandemic A(H1N1) 2009 in Germany, helping to minimize such  
195 differential recall. Lastly, we cannot rule out that further infections have occurred because we  
196 did not test all symptomatic persons. However, to estimate the influence of a possible  
197 incomplete outcome ascertainment, we repeated calculations using less specific outcomes,  
198 based on clinical definitions (influenza like illness and acute respiratory infection), but did not  
199 see a change for associated risks (data not shown). Nonetheless, caution should be exercised  
200 before generalising these results as the study was small in size, and confined to a particular  
201 setting and strain.

202  
203 Data on pandemic A(H1N1) 2009 transmission are limited [14-17] as are, in general, data on  
204 transmission from pre-symptomatic exposure and on presymptomatic shedding in naturally  
205 acquired influenza infections. We are aware of only one study where presymptomatic  
206 transmission was investigated and seemed to have occurred [5]. Data on shedding of seasonal  
207 influenza virus during the presymptomatic period is sparse [6;7;14;18;19]. Pooled data from  
208 experimental voluntary influenza infections indicate that viral shedding precedes illness by  
209 about one day [20], and experience from naturally acquired infections suggests that only 1-8%  
210 of infectiousness occurs prior to illness onset [9]. In conclusion, our results from an outbreak  
211 with one index case do not support that pre-symptomatic infectiousness plays a role in  
212 pandemic influenza transmission. Further evidence is required, ideally from larger studies with  
213 multiple index cases, to more accurately characterize the potential for presymptomatic  
214 transmission of influenza virus.

215 Addendum

216

217 Individual contributions of authors

218 J Hermes 1,2,3,4,5; H Bernard 1,2,3,4,5; U Buchholz 4,5; M Spackova 1,5; J Löw 1,5; G

219 Loytved 1,5; T Suess 1,4,5; W Hautmann 4,5; D Werber 1,2,3,4,5.

220 1 contribution to concept and design,

221 2 analysis and/or interpretation of data;

222 3 critical writing

223 4 revising the intellectual content;

224 5 final approval of the version to be published

225

226 Potential conflicts of interest

227 The authors do **all** not have a commercial or other association that might pose a conflict of

228 interest.

229

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- 290  
291

1 Table 1: Comparison of contacts to either of two travel returnees from Argentina (R1 and R2)  
 2 during outbreak of pandemic influenza virus 2009 in a teenage party cohort; June 2009,  
 3 Germany.

Contact exposure	cases	total	%	p-value
<b>Talking to R1</b>				0.004
0-1 min	0	0	0	
1-14 min	0	13	0	
15-60 min	2	6	33	
1-4 h	3	3	100	
>4 h	1	3	33	
<b>Frequency of kissing R1</b>				0.03
0x	0	2	0	
1-2x	2	16	13	
3-5x	2	3	67	
>5x	2	4	50	
<b>Duration of talking to R2</b>				0.35
0-1 min	1	1	100	
1-14 min	1	11	9	
15-60 min	0	5	0	
1-4 h	3	5	60	
>4 h	1	3	33	
<b>Frequency of kissing R2</b>				0.62
0x	0	1	0	
1-2x	3	13	23	
3-5x	2	8	25	
>3x	1	3	33	

4 **Footnote:** the denominator includes all party guests excluding R1 and R2;

5 P-value is given for the Wilcoxon rank sum-test.

1 **Table 2:** Risk factors<sup>a</sup> for infection with pandemic influenza virus in a teenage party cohort  
 2 (n=26), June 2009, Germany:

Exposure variables	ill	total	(%, 95% CI)	OR	95% CI	p-value
<b>gender</b>						
				7.6	0.7 - 413.2	0.12
Female	6	14	(43, 18-71)			
Male	1	12	(8, 0-38)			
<b>staying overnight</b>						
				7.5	0.9 - +Inf	0.06
Yes	7	17	(41, 18-67)			
No	0	9	(0, 0-33)			
<b>talking to the source case</b>						
				16.9	2.1 - +Inf	0.005
<b>&gt;=15 min<sup>b</sup></b>						
Yes	7	13	(54, 25- 81)			
No	0	13	(0, 0- 25)			
<b>kissing the source case</b>						
				11.6	1.2 - 179.1	0.014
<b>&gt; 2x<sup>b</sup></b>						
Yes	5	8	(63, 24 – 91)			
No	2	18	(11, 1 – 35)			

3 <sup>a</sup> Using exact logistic regression. Displayed are variables with a p-value <0.1

4 Exposures with p-value >0,1: Close dancing, sharing drinks, contacts to any other party guest,  
 5 contacts to an ill person outside the party, being at an international airport during the week prior  
 6 to party, talking to R2, hugging and kissing R2

7 <sup>b</sup> Variables were dichotomized at their median values.

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